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UNLEASH RCRA!
LETTING LOOSE THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS
OF RCRA CAN CHANGE THE WORLD
TIMOTHY 0. SCHIMPF*
INTRODUCTION
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),' one
of the most radical environmental laws ever created, has the
potential to rapidly clean every active facility that treats, stores,
or disposes of hazardous waste. Yet it remains mired in procedure
as these facilities continue to pollute the environment. Despite
some recent success, corrective action has not achieved RCRA's
potential for expeditious cleanup as paperwork and procedure has
continually bogged down the process.
This Note details RCRA corrective action procedure, its
history, and how, after many years of ineffective proposal regula-
tions, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has finally
made some cleanup progress. The proposed corrective action
between Dow Chemical and the State of Michigan brings this
system to light and shows how safeguards have prevented Dow
from escaping cleanup. Finally, the Note presents a few recommen-
dations on how to unleash RCRA to increase the efficiency of the
system and to use RCRA to its full potential.
I. RCRA
A. RCRA Early History
Congress enacted RCRA as an amendment to the Solid
Waste Disposal Act in 1976.2 "RCRA generally focuses on the
* Timothy 0. Schimpfgraduated with a J.D. in 2004 from William & Mary School
of Law. He wishes to thank his mother for her help and inspiration with this
topic and both his parents for all their love and support during law school.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
2 Id. RCRA only applies to "solid waste" but this term includes garbage, sludge,
or air pollution in the form of a "solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous
material." Id. § 1004(27).
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problems associated with handling and disposal of the billions of
tons of discarded material generated in this country each year,
from household trash, to sewage sludges, to highly complex
chemical substances."3 RCRA divides facilities 4 that contain
hazardous waste into three broad categories: (a) generator, (b)
transporter, and (c) treater, storer, or disposer ("TSD").5 Facilities
can fit into one or more of these categories.6
RCRA did not have any effect until 1980, when EPA adopted
regulations implementing its provisions.7 In order to execute
RCRA, EPA created a "cradle-to-grave" tracking system for
hazardous waste. s Generators of hazardous wastes must ensure
that their wastes are treated or disposed according to RCRA
specifications and must follow paperwork and recordkeeping
requirements.9 Transporters must ensure that their vehicles meet
structural specifications and must also follow paperwork and
recordkeeping requirements. 10
TSD facilities have far more requirements than generators
or transporters." Each TSD facility may have a number of solid
' Joseph F. Guida, Corrective Action Under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 44 Sw. L.J. 1331, 1333 (1991).
4 EPA defines "facility" as the entire property site and "not limited to those
portions of the owner's property at which units for the management of solid or
hazardous waste are located, but rather extends to all contiguous property under
the owner or operator's control." 50 Fed. Reg. 28,702, 28,712 (1985). This
definition was upheld in United Techs. Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 821 F.2d
714 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
5 40 C.F.R. §§ 262-265 (2003).6 Id.
7 Id. §§ 262-263.
8 Guida, supra note 3, at 1334. See Resource Conservation Recovery Act, § 42
U.S.C. § 6930 (2000) (notification of hazardous waste management activity);
§ 6922 (generator manifesting); § 6923 (transporter manifesting); § 6924 (treat-
ment, storage, and disposal facility manifesting). EPA's rules implementing the
manifest system are set forth at 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.23 (2003) (generator), 263.20
(transporter), and 265.71 (treatment, storage, and disposal facilities).
9 40 C.F.R. § 262 (2003).
'
0 Id. § 263.
" Id. §§ 124, 264-265.
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waste management units ("SWMUs"), such as storage tanks,
treatment units, or land disposal units. 2 All TSD facilities must
obtain a permit through a process which, while time-consuming,
is vital because the requirement of public notice and hearing can
serve as a safeguard against corruption.13 Permits must be
periodically reviewed and renewed. 14 Once a TSD obtains a permit,
it must go through the closure process to stop managing hazard-
ous waste. 5 Closure demands "arduous regulatory requirements." 6
Every TSD facility must be "clean closed" so no traces of hazardous
constituents exist in the site groundwater or soil, a process that
entails expensive and time-consuming cleaning. 7
The early version of RCRA, as implemented by EPA,
primarily prevented future hazardous waste problems.'" A corre-
ctive action procedure existed, but its scope was severely limited
and its impact minimal.'9 In 1984, Congress enacted the Hazard-
ous and Solid Waste Amendments and revolutionalized the effect
and impact of RCRA.2 ° Congress made "sweeping and ambiguous"
changes to the corrective action process that vastly expanded the
role of the corrective action to give EPA tremendous administrative
power.2'
12 Resource Conservation Recovery Act § 1004(28), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(28) (2000)
(stating that "'solid waste management' means the systematic administration
of activities which provide for the collection, source separation, storage,
transportation, transfer, processing, treatment, and disposal of solid waste").
13 40 C.F.R. § 124 (2003).
14 Id. § 270.50.
'5 Id. §§ 264.110-.120, .178, .197, .228, .258, .280, .310, .351.
16Richard G. Stoll, The New RCRA Cleanup Regime: Comparisons and Contrasts
with CERCLA, 44 Sw. L.J. 1299, 1303 (1991).
17 See supra note 15 and cited C.F.R. sections.
1 Stoll, supra note 16, at 1300.
19 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.90-.101 (2003).
20 Resource Conservation Recovery Act §§ 3004(u)-(v), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(u)-(v)
(2000).
21 Guida, supra note 3, at 1336.
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B. The Corrective Action: Statutes and Regulations
RCRA established a corrective action procedure with a
minimal amount of statutory language. The entire corrective
action process is set forth in just three small statute sections.22
Congress intended EPA to implement sections 3004(u) and (v)
through regulations, whereas section 3008(h) allows EPA to
require corrective action through an administrative order.23
Section 3004(u) of RCRA requires "corrective action for all
releases of hazardous waste or constituents from any solid waste
management unit at a treatment, storage, or disposal facility
seeking a permit... regardless of the time at which waste was
placed in such unit."24 The permits must include "schedules of
compliance for such corrective action (where such corrective action
cannot be completed prior to issuance of the permit) and assur-
ances of financial responsibility for completing such corrective
action. 25
Not only does RCRA require corrective action on TSD
facility sites, but its section 3004(v) also requires corrective action
"beyond the facility boundary where necessary to protect human
health and the environment."26 TSD facility owners do not need
corrective action beyond the facility if the owner "demonstrates to
the satisfaction of the Administrator that, despite the owner or
operator's best efforts, the owner or operator was unable to obtain
the necessary permission to undertake such action" on land beyond
the facility.
If EPA "determines that there is or has been a release of
hazardous waste into the environment from a facility . . . the
Administrator may issue an order requiring corrective action or
such other response measure as he deems necessary to protect
22 §§ 3004(u)-(v); § 3008(h).
23 Yd.
24 Id. § 3004(u).
25 Id.
26 1d. § 3004(v).
2 7 Id.
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human health or the environment .... , 2' EPA can also "commence
a civil action in the United States district court in the district in
which the facility is located for appropriate relief, including a
temporary or permanent injunction."29
Despite the fact that Congress ordered EPA to implement
the corrective action process through regulations, over twenty
years later the agency has still not codified any formal corrective
action regulations except for a few minor codifications.3" EPA
issued proposed regulations in 1990 that would have established
requirements for conducting remedial investigations, evaluating
potential remedies, and selecting and implementing remedies at
facilities that required corrective action for hazardous waste
releases.3' States and environmental groups criticized these regu-
lations as overemphasizing procedure and reports rather than
actual progress of cleanup. In 1996, EPA issued an advance
28 Resource Conservation Recovery Act § 3008(h)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h)(1)
(2000).
29 Id.
30 1d. § 2924(u). EPA did adopt two minor codification rules. On July 15, 1985,
EPA reiterated the statutory language of section 3004(u) in 50 Fed. Reg. 28,702,
40 C.F.R. §§ 264.90(a)(2) and 264.101. On December 1, 1987, EPA issued a
companion rule to its previous codification rule in 52 Fed. Reg. 45,788,40 C.F.R.
pts. 144, 264, 265, 270, and 271. EPA has also issued rules establishing proce-
dures for agency hearings on the issuance of unilateral corrective action order.
40 C.F.R. pts. 22, 24 (2003). The D.C. Circuit upheld these rules in the face of a
constitutional due process challenge. See generally Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
31 Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) at Hazardous
Waste Management Facilities, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,798 (July, 27, 1990) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 264-65,270-71) [hereinafter 1990 Proposed Rule]. The proposed
regulations would have created a new Subpart S in 40 C.F.R. Part 264. The
Subpart S proposal intended to establish "a comprehensive regulatory frame-
work" for corrective actions. Id. at 30,798-99 (1990).
32 The concerns of the states, environmental groups, and regulatory community
included "slow progress in achieving cleanup or other environmental results;
an emphasis on process and reports over actual work in the field; unrealistic,
impractical or overly conservative cleanup goals; excessive and detailed over-
sight; reluctance to authorize or recognize the work of state cleanup programs;
and, lack of meaningful public participation." Corrective Action for Releases
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notice of proposed rulemaking as part of an effort to re-evaluate
RCRA corrective action program.33 EPA indicated that it would
seek to implement more corrective actions instead of pursuing
final, comprehensive remedies at a few facilities.34
from Solid Waste Management Units at Hazardous Waste Management Faci-
lities, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,432, 19,435 (May 1, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch.1)
[hereinafter 1996 Proposed Rule].33 Id. at 19,432. EPA identified the following five objectives in reevaluating the
proposed 1990 regulations:
(1) Create a consistent, holistic approach to cleanups at RCRA
facilities;
(2) Establish protective, practical cleanup expectations;
(3) Shift more of the responsibilities for achieving cleanup goals
to the regulated community;
(4) Focus on opportunities to streamline and reduce costs; and,
(5) Enhance opportunities for timely, meaningful public partici-
pation.
Id. at 19,435.
3Id. at 19,436. The 1996 re-evaluation identified major corrective developments
since the proposed regulations of 1990. (1) Stabilization Initiative: Early imple-
mentation of the corrective action process had focused on complete and final
corrective actions at a small number of facilities. Id. EPA and the states soon
realized that comprehensive, corrective action was time-consuming and diverted
resources from even minimal, corrective action at other sites. Id. EPA imple-
mented the Stabilization Initiative "to achieve an increased overall level of
environmental protection by implementing a greater number of actions across
many facilities rather than following the more traditional process of pursuing
final, comprehensive remedies at a few facilities." 1996 Proposed Rule, supra
note 32, at 19,436. (2) Environmental Indicators for Corrective Action: Instead
of focusing on administrative process and paperwork to determine progress of a
corrective action, EPA now focuses management of corrective action on two
environmental indicators: Human Exposures Controlled Determination and
Groundwater Releases Controlled Determination. Id. (3) Consistency of Correc-
tive Action: Corrective Action is a remedy individual to each facility, but in order
to promote consistency, EPA proposed a Corrective Action Plan that "provides
an overall program implementation framework and model scopes of work for
site characterizations, interim actions, evaluation of remedial alternatives and
remedy implementation. Program implementors and facility owners/operators
can use these model scopes of work when developing site-specific strategies, work
plans, and schedules of compliance." Id. at 19,437.
486
RCRA CAN CHANGE THE WORLD
In 1999, EPA formally withdrew its regulations proposal
because it concluded that the current regulations gave it an
adequate basis upon which to authorize state corrective action
programs, that additional regulations might disrupt authorized
state programs, and that new rules were not necessary to ensure
that affected parties had an opportunity to influence its corrective
action decisions. 5 EPA had difficulty trying to create a uniform
regulatory system for all corrective actions because of the great
differences between corrective actions at different facilities.36
When the proposed guidelines were used, they were often "imple-
mented prescriptively and the intended flexibility underused."37
The only portion of the 1990 proposed regulations that
were finalized dealt with corrective action management units
("CAMUs") and temporary units ("TUs").31 CAMUs and TUs man-
age wastes generated at a TSD facility, not from ongoing produc-
tion processes, but during the course of corrective actions. 39 The
rule, finalized in 1993, gave agencies "considerable flexibility...
to tailor design, operating, closure and post-closure, and waste
treatment requirements to site- and waste-specific conditions. This
approach allowed a significantly broader range of cleanup options
" Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Units at Hazardous Waste
Management Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,604 (Oct. 7, 1999) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 264) [hereinafter Corrective Action].
We plan to withdraw most of the proposed rule because we have
determined that such regulations are not necessary to carry out the
Agency's duties under sections 3004(u) and (v). Additionally,
attempting to promulgate a comprehensive set of RCRA regulations
at this time could unnecessarily disrupt the 33 State programs
already authorized to carry out the Corrective Action Program in
lieu of EPA, as well as the additional State programs currently
undergoing review for authorization. This decision will end uncer-
tainty related to this rulemaking for State regulators and owners
and operators of hazardous waste management facilities.
Id.36 Id. at 54,606.
I37 d.
3sCorrective Action Management Units and Temporary Units; Corrective Action
Provisions Under Subtitle C, 58 Fed. Reg. 8658 (Feb. 16, 1993) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 260, 264-65, 268, 270-71).39 Id. at 8659.
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at individual sites and has led, at individual sites, to prompter
and more aggressive cleanup."41 In 2001, EPA amended CAMU
rules to establish specific definitions of wastes eligible for place-
ments in CAMUs, 4 ' detailed minimum design and operation
standards for CAMUs,42 and specific treatment standards for
wastes put in CAMUs 3
Without formal regulations, EPA has implemented the
corrective action program largely through policy statements and
technical guidance documents." EPA believes that "by focusing
[its] resources on developing guidance and training, rather than a
final rule, [it] can provide sufficient guidelines for the areas of the
program not governed by procedural regulations, but in a more
flexible format."45 While providing flexibility, its approach does
little for uniformity and "appears to leave much of the program to
40 Amendments to the Corrective Action Management Unit Rule, 67 Fed. Reg.
2962, 2964 (Jan. 22, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260, 264, 271) [here-
inafter Amendments].
41 "CAMU-eligible waste" means:
(i) All solid and hazardous wastes, and all media (including ground
water, surface water, soils, and sediments) and debris, that are
managed for implementing cleanup. As-generated wastes (either
hazardous or non-hazardous) from ongoing industrial operations at a
site are not CAMU-eligible wastes.
40 C.F.R. § 264.552(a)(1) (2003). The definition also distinguishes between as-
generated and cleanup wastes, includes intact and substantially intact tanks,
allows for nonhazardous, as-generated wastes to be placed in CAMUs if
placement would help treatment, and allows the regional administrator to
disallow the placement of certain types of waste in CAMUs. Id. § 264.552.
42 EPA added requirements that operators must meet minimum liner
requirements for new or replacement CAMUs, minimum design criteria for
CAMU caps, and "must notify and take corrective action, as necessary to protect
human health and the environment, for any releases from CAMUs to ground
water." Amendments, supra note 40, at 2977. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.552(e) (2003).
13 "[Pirincipal hazardous constituents," under the amendments, "must meet
either minimum national treatment standards adapted from the LDR Phase IV
soil treatment standards or, in specific circumstances, site-specific treatment
standards based on defined adjustment factors." Amendments, supra note 40, at
2981. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.552(e)(4) (2003).
4 Corrective Action, supra note 35, at 54,607.
45 Id.
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be developed on an ad hoc basis by regional and headquarters
enforcement personnel."4 6
C. State Administration of RCRA
EPA has delegated its authority under RCRA to state
governments and state cleanup programs, allowing them to
operate under the auspices of the federal RCRA program.47 Each
state enacts legislation meeting RCRA requirements, which is
approved by EPA.18 For example, in 1986, EPA granted the State
of Michigan the authority to administer a hazardous waste
program in Michigan instead of the federal program.4 9
Once EPA approves a state program, state laws apply to its
administration, but EPA preserves authority to enforce waste
permits issued under the state program and to take administra-
tive, civil, or criminal actions against violators.5" After approval, if
EPA becomes dissatisfied with the state program or the state's
enforcement activities, EPA can revoke the permit that granted
authority for the state program because of the state's failure to
meet specified standards.5 EPA can also overfile, which allows it
to intervene in a state action.52
46 Guida, supra note 3, at 1337.
47Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000).
Any State which seeks to administer and enforce a hazardous
waste program .. .may develop and . .. submit to [EPA] an
application. . . for authorization .... Such State is authorized
to carry out such program in lieu of the Federal program... and
to issue and enforce permits for the storage, treatment, or
disposal of hazardous waste ....
Id.
Id.
49 See 40 C.F.R. § 272.1150-.1199 (2004).
50 RCRA § 3008.
51 1d. § 3006(e). "Whenever the Administrator determines... that a State is not
administering and enforcing a program.., in accordance with requirements of
this section, he shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective action is
not taken within a reasonable time . . . the Administrator shall withdraw
authorization of such program.. .. " Id.
52 See id. § 3008. Overfiling occurs "[wihen the EPA exercises its authority to
prosecute an alleged violator in an approved state that has already initiated its
4892005]
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Tension exists between EPA and the states. For many
years, EPA quantitatively measured state success through paper-
work, and not necessarily cleanup results, while states pushed for
actual cleanup.53 Although EPA has reformed its approach, states
still believe they do a better job of handling enforcement and want
to develop methods in response to their needs. 4 "EPA's perspec-
tive appears to be that they own the ranch and that we, the States,
are the hired ranch hands."55 States want more independence to
conduct their programs and enforcement audits.56
D. RCRA's Relationship With CERCLA
Facilities that release hazardous substances may be liable
for cleanup under the more well-known, federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
("CERCLA"), or "Superfund."57 Any hazardous substance desig-
nated by EPA under the Clean Air Act,58 the Clean Water Act,59
the Toxic Substances Control Act,6" or RCRA61 falls under
CERCLA. EPA must also designate any additional substances,
own enforcement action for the same requirements against the same defendant."
William Daniel Benton, Application of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel to
EPA Overfiling, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. REV. 199, 203-04 (1988).
5 For a discussion of RCRA implementation, see infra Part II.B.
54See Environmental Self Audits: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Oversight
and Investigators of the House Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. 48 (1998)
(statement of Hon. Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, State of Colorado); States
Report Progress on Relationship with Federal Government on Enforcement, 28
ENV'T REP. CURRENT DEV. 322 (BNA) (June 13, 1997).
" The Relationship Between the Federal and State Governments in the
Enforcement ofEnvironmental Laws: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Env't and
Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 198 (1997) (prepared statement of Patricia S. Bangert,
Director of Legal Policy, Attorney General's Office, State of Colorado).
5 6 id.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). For a general overview of CERCLA, see John
C. Cruden, CERCLA Overview, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, June
2003.
58 CERCLA § 101(14). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (2000).
'9 CERCLA § 101(14). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (2000).
60 CERCLA § 101(14). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (2000).
61 CERCLA § 101(14). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (2000).
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other than petroleum and natural gas,62 that are dangerous to
human health or the environment.
CERCLA covers a broader range of hazardous substances
than RCRA. For example, the substance must be a waste to trig-
ger RCRA, whereas any substance falls under CERCLA.64 In
addition, CERCLA grants EPA jurisdiction over pollutants or
contaminants,65 which are substances that are not on CERCLA's
hazardous substance list but "will or may reasonably be antici-
pated to cause" any type of adverse effects on human health or
the environment.6 6
EPA intended its corrective action program to have more
flexibility than CERCLA's method, especially in sampling, ana-
lysis, and nature and extent of studies. 67 "RCRA cleanups will be
less complex and less expensive than those under CERCLA, and
less detailed study will be required before remedial action be-
gins."68 RCRA facilities are also supposed to have greater flexibility
to select and implement remedies than CERCLA facilities. 69 For
example, unlike CERCLA facilities,7 ° RCRA facilities may fre-
quently be able to propose a single remedial alternative.7 '
CERCLA handles the biggest cleanups, while RCRA is
intended for smaller, individual facilities. "Most RCRA facilities
pose significantly lower environmental and human health risks
than Superfund sites, and therefore the need to pursue complete
cleanup at such [RCRA] facilities will often be less urgent."72 Both
CERCLA and RCRA may apply to a single facility, but EPA
62 CERCLA § 101(14), § 102(a).
63 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
§ 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2000).
40 C.F.R. pt. 261 app. VIII (1989).
65 CERCLA § 102(a).
66 Id. § 101(33).
67 1990 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, at 30,802.
68 Jd.
69 Id.
70 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed.
Reg. 8666, 8712 (Mar. 8, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) [hereinafter
Contingency Plan].
71 Id. at 30,805.
72 1990 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, at 30,833.
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generally prefers RCRA when there is a current owner onsite and
RCRA corrective action is an option.73
II. CORRECTIVE ACTION IN ACTION
More than 5000 facilities, three times the number of sites on
the National Priorities List under CERCLA, are subject to
corrective action under RCRA.7 4 All TSD facilities seeking a permit
for hazardous waste must go through the corrective action
process.
A. Corrective Action Process
Once EPA determines the facility is subject to corrective
action, the process consists of four main steps: assessment,
investigation, remedy selection, and remedy implementation.
1. RCRA Facility Assessment
The process for identifying all of the known SWMUs and
Areas of Concern at a facility is RCRA Facility Assessment
("RFA"). 76 Because of the subjective nature of the investigation,
the RFA report is prepared, not by the facility owner, but by the
state, EPA, or a contractor to the agencies.77 The RFA consists of
a preliminary review, visual site inspection, and sampling visit.7
8
The investigator begins the preliminary review by review-
ing available, written information such as permit applications,
inspection reports, and CERCLA notifications. 79 The investigator
73 Id. at 30,853.
"' 1996 Proposed Rule, supra note 32, at 19,440.
15 40 C.F.R. 124, 264-265 (2003).76 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, RCRA FACILITY ASSESS-
MENT GUIDANCE 1-2 NTIS, Document No. PB 87-107769 (1986) [hereinafter RFA
GUIDANCE].
77 Id. at 1-5.
78 Id. at 1-2, 1-3.
79Id. at 2-1.
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may also interview facility employees, agency officials, and local
residents."0 The investigator may request, from the facility
owner, any additional information that the investigator deems
necessary.8'
One of the most important parts of RCRA process, the visual
site inspection, determines whether, and to what extent, sampling
data should be obtained. 2 The investigator visually inspects the
facility and, depending upon whether the investigator believes a
release has occurred, recommends a sampling.
The investigator takes a sampling, if necessary, to deter-
mine whether hazardous materials have seeped into the earth or
water by testing all potential waste pathways.8 4 The investigator
needs to select the proper sampling method, parameters, and loca-
tion. 5 The investigator must follow EPA quality guidelines and
disclose, to the facility owner upon his or her request, a duplicate
sampling. 6
After completion of the RFA, the investigator may make a
recommendation for further action for a specific SWMU or for the
entire facility. 7 The investigator's four possible recommendations
are: 1) no further investigation necessary; 2) RCRA facility inves-
tigation required; 3) interim measures necessary at facility; and
4) facility should be referred to another EPA office. 8
The investigator can recommend interim actions, or, if an
imminent threat is found at any time during the process, the state
0 Id. at 2-1, 2-5, 2-6.
81 Section 3007 of RCRA grants EPA extensive authority to gather information.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (2000).
82 RFA GUIDANCE, supra note 76, at 3-6.
83 Id. at 3-1, 3-7.
84Id. at 4-1.
85 Id. at 4-3.
86 Id. at 4-6 to -8,4-11.87 Id. at 4-14.
88 RFA GUIDANCE, supra note 76, at 4-16 to -18. A recommendation of no further
action means either that there is no evidence to indicate that there has been a
release from the unit or that the unit is being addressed under the permit or
under a closure plan, both of which have specific requirements for corrective
action. Id.
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or EPA can require the facility to promptly conduct interim
89corrective measures. Interim measures are taken to prevent more
extensive environmental damage while permanent measures are
decided.9 Interim measures include source controls, such as run-
off controls and temporary covers, and exposure controls, such as
fences and alternative drinking water.91
2. RCRA Facility Investigation
The second stage of the corrective action process is the
RCRA Facility Investigation ("RFI"). "The purpose of the RFI is
to obtain information to fully characterize the nature, extent and
rate of migration of releases of hazardous waste or constituents
and to interpret this information to determine whether interim
corrective measures and/or a Corrective Measures Study may be
necessary."92 The investigation can concentrate on only one
SWMU or can involve complex testing of multiple medias.93 The
facility prepares and submits work plans to investigate SWMUs
that require further action.9a Upon state or EPA approval of the
investigation and sampling plans, the facility conducts sampling
and submits the results in a report detailing the type, amount, and
migration of wastes.95 Based upon the findings, the state then
determines which units require actual cleanup.
89 1990 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, at 30,839.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OSWER DIRECTIVE
9502.00-6D, INTERIM FINAL: RCRA FACILITY INVESTIGATION (RFI) GUIDANCE i
(1989), available at http://www.epa.gov/correctiveaction/resource/guidance/site
char/rfi.htm.
13 Id. at 1-6.
94 Id. at 1-7.
" Id. at 1-6. Characterization includes identification of the type and concen-
tration of hazardous waste or hazardous constituents released, the rate and
direction at which the releases are migrating, and the distance over which
releases have migrated. Id.
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3. Corrective Measures Study
The Corrective Measures Study ("CMS") "identiflies] and
evaluate[s] potential remedial alternatives for the releases that
have been identified at a facility."96 The owner of the facility
submits the CMS report listing specific proposed cleanup options
for those units determined to require actual cleanup and an
assessment of the effectiveness and costs of each remedy.9" The
CMS report details how the proposed remedy would protect human
health and the environment, the remedy's cleanup effectiveness,
how the remedy would control sources of releases, how the remedy
would comply with cleanup standards, and general factors, such as
cost, short-term and long-term reliability, and implementation.
After a tentative decision is reached on how to clean up the units,
the state and EPA require a public notice to solicit comments on
the proposed remedy. 99
4. Corrective Measure Implementation
After public comments are considered, the Corrective
Measures Study is given final approval.'0 0 The facility submits
the Corrective Measures Implementation ("CMI") plan, the final
detailed design for the cleanup. The purpose of the CMI is "to
design, construct, operate, maintain and monitor the performance
of the corrective measure."'0 ' The CMI details a series of design
plans: Conceptual Design, Operation and Maintenance, Cons-
truction, Health and Safety, Public Involvement, and Proposed
Schedule.' 2
96 OFFICE OF WASTE PROGRAMS ENFORCEMENT, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OSWER DIRECTIVE 9902.3-2A, RCRA CORRECTIVE ACTION
PLAN (FINAL) 47 (1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/correctiveaction/re
source/guidance/gen-ca/rcracap.pdf [hereinafter RCRA PLAN].
97 Id. at 50-56.
98 Id. at 52-54.
99 Id. at 56-57.
100 Id.10 Id. at 59.
102 RCRA PLAN, supra note 96, at 61-62.
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B. The Long Road to Implementation
1. 1984 to 1997: Age of Regulatory Uncertainty Leads to Little
Cleanup
The road to implementation of corrective action at facilities
has been rocky. In 1993, the U.S. General Accounting Office
("GAO") reported that EPA data showed that only about 1% of the
3700 permitted, contaminated facilities had undertaken cleanup
actions. 10 3 By 1997, only 8% had completed cleanup, including only
5% of the highest priority sites. 10 4 Of those not completed, 17% had
implemented cleanup remedies, 14% had taken some action to
contain contamination so it did not threaten human health or the
environment, and 14% had investigated contamination.0 5 Fifty-
six percent of the facilities, including 35% of the highest priority
sites, had yet to begin the formal cleanup process.0 6
EPA did little to implement RCRA in its initial years but,
as it gradually began to do so, managed to create a procedure so
burdensome that over half the facilities had not even begun
cleaning up thirteen years after RCRA's creation.0 7 Four key
factors slowed implementation. First, the cumbersome nature of
RCRA's early corrective action process proved costly and time-
consuming due to multiple report and review requirements.
0 8
Facility owners complained that the rigid process caused EPA
officials to focus on making the facility comply with every minute
103 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-15, HAZARDOUS WASTE: MUCH
WORK REMAINS TO ACCELERATE FACILITY CLEANUPS 1 (1993).
104 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-98-3, HAZARDOUS WASTE:
PROGRESS UNDER THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM Is LIMITED BUT NEW
INITIATIVES MAY ACCELERATE CLEANUPS 1 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 GAO
REPORT).
'
0 5 Id. at 2.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 9.
496
RCRA CAN CHANGE THE WORLD
procedural detail of the cleanup rather than whether the facility
met its cleanup goals and objectives. °9 The detailed CMS require-
ments created a costly paperwork burden that was largely un-
necessary for many facilities."0 The rigidity of EPA procedures
did not come from RCRA, but from EPA CERCLA procedures."'
EPA officials admitted that instead of coming up with a flexible
RCRA process, they had simply copied the detailed procedural
steps of CERCLA." 2
The disagreement between companies, states, and EPA over
the appropriate remedies and cleanups caused numerous delays
because of prolonged negotiations and further studies. 1 3 Part of
the disagreement arose over the RFA recommendations and the
type of RFI and CMS required." 4 EPA held facilities in different
regions to different standards, even similar facilities of the same
company in different regions."' Even worse, regulators for EPA
and the state, when both had oversight, often disagreed over
facility cleanup standards and imposed duplicative requirements
on facilities." 6
Facilities' lack of desire to clean slowed and continues to
slow implementation. EPA and states must guide facilities because
if they do not order facilities to perform corrective actions, then a
facility would only perform the corrective action if in its business
interest. 1 7 Some motivations, such as liability to the public, are
enough to cause facilities to ensure that they are not a threat to
human safety but are not enough to cause operators to extensively
109 Id. One facility complained that it used most of the $28 million it spent on
cleanup investigation, not for actual cleanup, but instead to comply with EPA
procedural requirements. 1997 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 9.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 10.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 11.
115 1997 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 11.
116 Id. At one facility, it took four years to resolve the differences between state
and EPA requirements for closing a landfill. Id.117 Id. at 12.
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clean their facilities.118 Some facilities began cleanup investi-
gations before EPA involvement in order to save money by
avoiding EPA procedures, but the uncertainty of EPA require-
ments discouraged most from being proactive."19
Finally, the lack of federal and state resources to initiate or
oversee cleanups has prevented facilities from even starting and
prevents oversight of ongoing cleanups.12' Facilities have com-
plained that, although they have waited years for EPA to oversee
their cleanups, EPA has been unable to provide assessments
because of its massive work backlog. 121 EPA did not assess lower
priority facilities until the early 1990s. 122 Its work backlog was the
reason EPA authorized states to implement the corrective action
program, and this authorization helped decrease backlog.
123
Despite the states' help, however, resources remained limited. For
example, in fiscal year 1997, the Philadelphia region had the re-
sources to start cleaning only four of sixty-nine high-priority
facilities and none of eighty-six lower-priority facilities.
124
2. 1997 to 2003: RCRA Reforms Lead to Progress
New initiatives taken by EPA resulted in progress by
2000,125 when GAO reported on 1112 high priority facilities it had
first studied in 1997.126 While the number of cleaned facilities had
grown from fifty-seven to only seventy-two, the number of facilities
that had not started cleanup had shrunk from 325 to 114, a drop
in facilities from 29.2% to 10.3%.127 As facilities had investigated
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 1997 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 13.
121 Id. at 14.
12
2 Id.
123 Id. at 14-15.124 Id. at 15.
125 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-224, HAZARDOUS WASTE:
EPA HAS REMOVED SOME BARRIERS TO CLEANUPS (2000) [hereinafter 2000 GAO
REPORT].
126 Id. at 15 n.8.
127 Id. at 16.
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and begun to implement remedies, the number of facilities with
contamination under control had grown from 82 (7.4%) to 189
(17%). 128 The number of facilities implementing final remedies had
grown from 142 (12.8%) to 231 (20.8%).129
The primary reason for this progress was the decision to
abandon the stringent 1990 proposed rules. 3 ° Focus had shifted
from following procedural steps to achieving results.13 1 EPA was
holding facilities accountable based not on the number of proce-
dural steps they had completed, but instead on cleanup results.'32
EPA was giving facilities flexibility to determine their cleanup
based on projected future use of the land, greatly reducing proce-
dures on future, industrial-use lands because facilities no longer
had to meet stringent residential cleanup standards.
33
To measure cleanup results, EPA developed RCRA
Corrective Action Environmental Indicators ("El"). 34 The two Els,
now the top priority of RCRA, evaluate and report acceptability of
current site conditions.'35 The Current Human Exposures Under
Control ("Human Exposure El") is a qualitative assessment of
the risk of human exposure.136 Human exposure is under control
"when there are no unacceptable risks to humans due to releases
128Id.
129 Id.
30 See Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Units at Hazardous Waste
Management Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,604 (1999).
131 See Corrective Action for Releases From Solid Waste Management Units at
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,432 (May 1, 1986).
132 Id. at 19,435.
133 Id. at 19,436.
134 Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,432, 19,436-37
(1999). See SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCYRESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
HANDBOOK OF GROUNDWATER PROTECTION AND CLEANUP POLICIES FOR RCRA
CORRECTIVE ACTION 2.1-.7 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/
hazwaste/ca/resource/guidance/gw/gwhandbk/gwhb041404.pdf [hereinafter EPA
HANDBOOK]. The EI reform first began in response to the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993)
(codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
135 EPA HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 2.1.
136 Corrective Action for Releases from Solid Waste Management Units at
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,432, 19,436 (1999).
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of contaminants at or from the facility."137 The Migration of Conta-
minated Groundwater Under Control ("Groundwater EI") is an
assessment of risk to environmental resources from contaminated
groundwater.138 Groundwater contamination is under control when
facilities control "the migration of groundwater contamination at
or from the facility across designated boundaries."'39 State or EPA
regulators use a simple EPA El form to analyze basic conditions at
each facility. 14 The result of the EI is: "YES," meaning that the
conditions are under control; "NO," meaning that the conditions
are not under control; or "IN," meaning that there was insufficient
data to determine if the conditions are under control.'
The purpose of the EI is to stabilize all RCRA facilities and
begin cleanup, but it serves as an indicator of only current
exposure at the facility and not of final cleanup. 42 The EI does not
address whether corrective action is complete at the site, whether
remedial long-term goals are met, or the safety of the site for
future land use.
143
EPA sets performance goals of conditions under control, at
high priority facilities, for 95% of Human Exposure EI and for
70% of Groundwater El.'4 4 As of February 2, 2005, 1167 of 1714
facilities, or 68%, had a "YES" on both Human Exposure EI and
Groundwater EI.1
45
Another reason for the progress in cleanup occurred in 1998,
when EPA issued a guidance document on remediation waste
management. 46 This document clearly explained several policies,
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR RCRA
CORRECTIVE ACTION ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS 3 (1999).
141 id.
14' EPA HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 2.6.
143 Id.
14 Id. at 2.1.
145 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACILITIES HAVING BOTH EIs (YEs/YEs), THAT ARE
FACILITIES ON THE RCRA GPRA CLEANUP BASELINE 2 (2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/correctiveaction/eis/verfd.pdf.
146 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 7.
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previously unknown or unclear to state and regional administra-
tors, which would allow some facilities, in certain circumstances,
to manage remediation waste without corrective action.'4 7 With
this added guidance, state administrators have reported great
success in using alternative means, without corrective action, to
properly handle waste."4
In 1998, EPA also finalized a rule intended to ease
procedural burdens of managing remediation waste and to allow
easier, short-term storage for remediation waste. 149 This rule
made a significant procedural change by allowing facilities that
did not want RCRA permits, but still conducted cleanup actions,
to manage cleanup in stages instead of requiring facility-wide
cleanup. 5 ° EPA also adopted less stringent soil standards, which
was a significant incentive for facility owners.' 5 '
3. 2003-2008: RCRA Reforms in the Future
EPA's strategic plan for 2003-2008 establishes a road map
for EPA governance, including a RCRA goal of moving toward more
final remedies. 5 2 EPA will complete a new list of high priority
facilities by the end of fiscal year 2004.13 By the end of fiscal year
2008, EPA goals are to assess every new RCRA baseline facility,
'
47 Id. For example, when a facility has made a good faith effort to determine if
a substance is a hazardous waste, but the results are inconclusive, the facility
operators may assume that the substance is not hazardous if it does not display
hazardous material characteristics. Id. In another example, facilities can
consolidate adjacent, different wastes. Id. In a further example, facilities can
exclude remediation waste from RCRA requirements if the waste poses no threat
to human health. Id. at 7-8.
148 Id. at 7.
149 The Hazardous Remediation Waste Management Requirements (HWIR-
Media): Final Rule, 40 C.F.R. pt. 260 (1998).
150 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 8.
151 Id.
152 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2003-2008 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN: DIRECTION FOR
THE FUTURE 59 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocfopage/plan/2003sp.pdf
[hereinafter 2008 STRATEGIC PLAN].153 Id. at 64.
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to limit all human exposures from site contamination to health-
based levels for current land and ground water use conditions at
95% of new RCRA baseline facilities, to control the migration of
contaminated ground water at 80% of new RCRA baseline faci-
lities, to select final remedies at 30% of new RCRA baseline
facilities, and to complete construction of remedies at 20% of new
RCRA baseline facilities.154 Remedies must address the entire site
and not just a partial remedy.'55
III. CASE STUDY: Dow AND MDEQ
Each facility deals with different requirements and proce-
dures to formalize its corrective action, but, eventually, the facility
and the government agree on a corrective action. One final step
and safeguard, public scrutiny, remains for the corrective action.
As the experiences of Dow Chemical prove, although corrective
action entails expediency, it is not a way to circumvent environ-
mental safety.
A. Relevant Facts
The Dow Chemical Company's headquarters have been on
the banks of the Tittabawassee River in Midland, Michigan, since
1897.156 In the past, it has manufactured chemicals like bleach,
bromine, mustard gas, Agent Orange, chlorinated pesticides and
clorophenol.'5 7 Two byproducts of Dow's chemical manufacturing
are highly toxic, hazardous wastes, polychlorinated dibenzo-p-
dioxin ("CDDs") and chlorodibenzofurans ("CDFs") isomers,
154 Id. at 64-65.
155 Id.
156 Sheila Schimpf, More Samples Taken Near Dow Facility As Assessment of
Dioxin Levels Continues, 33 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 22, at A-7 (May 31, 2002)
[hereinafter Schimpf, More Samples]. For a history of Dow Chemical, see
generally E.N. BRANDT, GROWTH COMPANY: Dow CHEMICAL'S FIRST CENTURY
(1997), DON WHITEHEAD, THE Dow STORY: THE HISTORY OF THE Dow CHEMICAL
COMPANY (1968), and http://www.dow.com.
157 Schimpf, More Samples, supra note 156, at A-7; Eric Pianin, Mich. Weighs
Lower Dioxin Standards: Engler's Critics Accuse Him of Giving Dow Chemical
a 'Sweetheart Deal,' WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2002, at A02.
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collectively called dioxin. 5 ' Dioxin causes cancer and numerous
other health problems in humans and animals.'59
118 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. HEALTH SERV., AGENCY FOR
Toxic SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, TOxIcOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR
CHLORINATED DIBENZO-P-DIOXINS 357 (1998) [hereinafter ATSDR FOR CDDs];
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. HEALTH SERV., AGENCY FOR
Toxic SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR
CHLORODIBENZOFURANS 111 (1994). Seventy-five different CDDs and 135
different CDFs, called "congener," have varying levels of toxicity, but only seven
CDDs and ten CDFs have dioxin-like toxicity. Id. Dioxin is most commonly used
in relation to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin ("TCDD"), which is the most
potent and well-studied of the dioxins. ATSDR FOR CDDs, supra, at 357. To
demarcate the toxicity of dioxin compounds, each is assigned a toxic equivalency
factor ("TEF") by rating each congener's toxicity relative to TCDD. NAT'L CTR.
FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EXPOSURE AND HUMAN HEALTH ASSESSMENT OF 2,3,7,8-TETRACHLORO-
DIBENZO-P-DIOXIN (TCDD) AND RELATED COMPOUNDS 921 (2000), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/dioxin/part2/fm-chap9.pdf. The health risk ofeach
is measured in the congener's Toxic Equivalents ("TEQ"), determined by
multiplying the concentration of a dioxin congener by its toxicity factor ("TEF").
Id. The total TEQ is then derived by adding all of the TEQ values for each
congener. Id. A dioxin is frequently referred to in parts per trillion ("ppt") in
reference to its TEQ. Id. The term "dioxin" is used here only in relation to those
dioxins that are sufficiently toxic to have a TEF. See also Addition of Dioxin and
Dioxin-Like Compounds; Modification of Polychlorinated Biphenyls ("PCBs")
Listing; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community Right-to-Know, 62 Fed.
Reg. 24,887 (May 7, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372) (adding dioxin to
the list of chemicals under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986).
159 Studies have looked at the effect of dioxin on humans from direct exposure,
such as Vietnam veterans' exposure to Agent Orange and mass industrial
pollution in Times Beach, Missouri; Love Canal, New York; and Seveso, Italy.
ATSDR FOR CDDs, supra note 158, at 9. Results are mixed because of unknown
variables and the difficulty of isolating the dioxin effect from exposure to other
chemicals. Id. Dioxin causes severe Chloracne, a skin disease, and EPA has
deemed dioxin a human carcinogen. Id. at 10. According to the International
Agency for Research on Cancer, 2,3,7,8-TCDD can cause human cancer. Id. In
animal studies, dioxin has been linked to endometriosis immune-system-
impairment, diabetes, neurotoxicity, birth defects, miscarriages, decreased
fertility, testicular atrophy, reduced production of sperm, reproductive
dysfunction, and cancer. Id. at 11-12.
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Soil and sediment testing in the middle 1980s, 1996, and
1998 revealed high levels of dioxin on the Dow plant site and
decreasing levels of dioxin on samples farther away from the
plant. 6 ° Health problems attributed to dioxin poisoning have
lingered for years in Midland, including reports of abnormal
headaches, nosebleeds, oral pus sacs, seizures, birth defects, and
mutated wildlife.' 6' Through testing, in early 2002, the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality ("MDEQ") determined that
Dow was the source of highly dangerous levels of dioxin in the
Tittabawassee River and its flood plain, downstream from Dow's
facilities.162
Dioxin's health risk is measured in parts per trillion ("ppt"),
and Michigan law deems a dioxin level over ninety ppt unsafe for
humans and requires immediate cleanup if such a level is mea-
sured in residential areas.163 During testing in 2001, MDEQ took
thirty-six initial samples from downriver areas lying within the
Tittabawassee River floodplain and found dioxin levels ranging
from thirty-five ppt to 7261 ppt.' 4 On Dow property, the highest
160 Schimpf, More Samples, supra note 156, at A-7.
161 STEPHEN M. ROSOFF ET AL., PROFIT WITHOUT HONOR: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
AND THE LOOTING OF AMERICA 142-43 (1998). Midland residents reported green
deer meat, three-legged chickens, bald cows, backward-winged geese, and
squirrels with no tails. Id. Residents suffered a variety of physical maladies, an
infant mortality rate sixty-seven percent above normal, and birth deformities,
including a girl born with black, rabbit-ear-shaped teeth. Id. "Dow Country"
had dioxin levels six times higher than those at the Love Canal site in New York.
Id. MDEQ tests revealed high levels of dioxin in local farmers' eggs that the
farmers had consumed for some time. Dave Scroppo, A Plan for Cleaning Up
Dioxins Sets OffAnxiety: Would It Be Enough? Officials to Discuss Dow Proposal
Today, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 20, 2002, at A5, available at http://www.
freep.com/news/mich/diox20_20021220.htm.
162 Allan B. Taylor & John McCabe, Baseline Chemical Characterization of
Saginaw Bay Watershed Sediments: A Report to the Office of the Great Lakes
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 16, Environmental Manage-
ment Division, MDEQ, Aug. 29, 2002, available at http://www.deq.state.
mi.us/documents/deq-rrd-dioxin-FinalReport.pdf.
16 Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 324.20120a (2004).
164 DEQ Envtl. Response Div., Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, INFORMATION
BULLETIN: TITTABAWASSEE/SAGINAW RIVER FLOOD PLAIN (2002), available at
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measured dioxin level on the perimeter was 1068 ppt, and the
highest measured dioxin level along the route used by Dow
vehicles was 2663 ppt.'65 The highest measured dioxin level,
outside Midland, was thirty-five ppt. 166 In short, significant areas
of soils at and near the Dow facility and in residential and other
areas around Midland are currently contaminated with dioxin
levels in excess of ninety ppt.
Governor John Engler's twelfth and final year in office was
2002.167 The Engler administration had few policies protecting the
environment but many policies favoring big businesses, such as
Dow Chemical."' The Engler administration greatly influenced
MDEQ through its director, Russell Harding. 169
As a TSD facility, Dow sought to renew its hazardous waste
permit under RCRA. MDEQ and Dow created a proposal to enter
into a corrective action consent order, pursuant to which Dow
would clean up toxic waste in exchange for its release from
pollution liability. 171 Instead of requiring the state law mandated
http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-erd-trf-DEQ-dioxin-bulletin-
(FINAL).pdf.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 The 46th Governor of Michigan, John Engler, was first elected in 1990 and
won reelection in 1994 and 1998. For a biography on Governor Engler, see
http://www.michigan.gov/engler/.
161 "Engler treated Michigan's natural resources as an exploitable commodity,
and some businesses and developers gleefully jumped on for the ride." Time to
Take the Profit Out of Flaunting the Law, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE, Aug.
24,2003, at A5, available at http://www.record-eagle.com/2003/aug/082403.htm.
"To the chagrin of many ethical, hardworking DEQ employees, the governor and
[MDEQ Director Russell] Harding transformed the agency into a body that
looked for ways to excuse polluters.. . ." Id.
169 A 1998 survey of MDEQ employees found great resentment toward Harding
and Engler. Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, 1998 PEER
Survey of Michigan's Department of Environmental Quality, available at
http://www.peer.org/publications/srvy-mi-deq2.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
Harding is called Engler's lackey and "Ftihrer Harding. If he ever shakes your
hand, be sure afterwards to count your fingers and wash off the slime." Id.
170 See In re Dow Chemical Co., Michigan DEQ, No. 111-**-02, REMEDIATION &
REDEVELOPMENT Div., MICH. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PROPOSED Dow CORRE-
CTIVE ACTION CONSENT ORDER (2002), available at http://www.ecocenter.org/
releases/20021108consent.shtml [hereinafter CONSENT ORDER]; Sheila Schimpf,
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dioxin level of ninety ppt,' 71 the consent order attempted to
establish an "interim action level" of 831 ppt, nearly ten times
higher.172 This threshold "interim action level" would trigger
Dow's responsibility to perform corrective action under the con-
sent order, while any lesser level would not require action. 73 The
"interim action level" may have later been increased, based on
health studies. 74
The proposed consent order was completed in late summer,
2002 and, as RCRA procedures dictate, was released for public
comment on November 9, 2002. 17' The Michigan Attorney Gen-
eral's Office expressed its dissatisfaction by calling the consent
order an "'11th hour' and 'sweetheart deal." 76 In an internal
memo, the Office stated that it believed that the consent order
was "illegal and that DEQ lack[ed] the legal authority to sign
it." 77 The Attorney General believed that MDEQ had rushed into
State Agency Reaches Accord With Dow On Levels of Dioxins Near Midland
Facility, 33 ENV'TREP. (BNA) No. 25, 2476 (Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Schimpf,
Accord].
171 On May 27, 2004, Michigan State Senator Tony Stamas and House Repre-
sentative John Moolenaar introduced identical bills that would raise the dioxin
level in Michigan from 90 ppt to 1000 ppt. H.R. 5963, 92nd Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2004); S. 1276, 92nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2004). On June 1, 2004, the
House of Representatives referred H.R. 5963 to the Committee on Government
Operations, and the Senate referred S. 1276 to the Committee on Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Affairs. H.R. 92-49, Reg. Sess., at 1157 (Mich. 2004);
S. 92-54, Reg. Sess., at 988 (Mich. 2004).
172 CONSENT ORDER, supra note 170. Dow claimed that "[tlhe 831 ppt level is
considered a safe level protective of public health." Schimpf, Accord, supra note
170, at 2476.
171 CONSENT ORDER, supra note 170. See also Schimpf, Accord, supra note 170,
at 2476.
171 CONSENT ORDER, supra note 170.
171 Sheila Schimpf, Dow Cleanup Agreement Criticized By Michigan Attorney
General's Office, 26 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) No. 44, 1403 (Nov. 11, 2002) [here-
inafter Schimpf, Criticized].
176 Id. at 1404.
17' E-mail from Robert Reichel, Assistant Attorney General, State of Michigan
Attorney General's Office, to Art Nash, Deputy Director, Michigan Department
of Environmental Quality (Oct. 11, 2002, 15:56 EDT), available at http://www.
ecocenter.orglreleases/october 1_2002_agmemo.shtml.
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the consent order and that MDEQ was acting arbitrarily and
capriciously.
178
MDEQ was under a strict timetable to finish the consent
order by the end of 2002.179 On December 31, 2002, Governor
Engler's term ended. The consent order needed to be finalized
because a Democrat, Jennifer Granholm, was certain to be elected
in November and had promised on the campaign trail not to enter
into the consent order.1
8 0
During the period of public comment, which lasted until
December 9, 2002, any person or group could file a comment with
MDEQ supporting or opposing the consent order.' EPA filed a
scathing comment that sharply criticized the consent order,
stating that "[tihe Agency believes the conclusions used in the
calculation used to determine this interim action level are incon-
sistent with Section 3004(u) and Section 3004(v) of RCRA, Section
324.20120a of NREPA and MI R299.9629 because they are not
sufficiently protective of human health and the environment." 18 2
178 Id.
179 When asked if MDEQ wanted to complete the consent order by the end of
2002, Deputy Director Nash said, "[tihat would certainly be our goal." Schimpf,
Criticized, supra note 175, at 1404.
18. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 601-02 n.193
(2003); Pianin, supra note 157, at A02; Scroppo, supra note 161, at A5.
181 Sheila Schimpf, Michigan Residents Seek to Intervene in Consent Order With
Dow Chemical, 26 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) No. 48, 1521 (Dec. 9, 2002) [here-
inafter Schimpf, Residents].
182 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT CORRECTIVE ACTION
CONSENT ORDER BETWEEN THE MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY AND Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY, MIDLAND, MICHIGAN 9 (2002),
available at http://www.ecocenter.org/releases/EPACOComments.pdf. "U.S.
EPA objects to the CACO to the extent that the Order in any way delegates any
regulatory responsibilities assumed by the State of Michigan from U.S. EPA
under RCRA, to Dow or any other third party." Id. at 3. The Ecology Center,
an environmentalist group, said that they have never seen EPA's comments "so
critical of an action by a state agency." Sheila Schimpf, State Judge Allows
Corrective Action Order Proposed Between Michigan, Dow Chemical, 26 CHEM.
REG. REP. 1548 (BNA) (Dec. 16, 2002).
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Environmental groups were incensed over the consent order,
particularly Ecology Center and Lone Tree Council." 3
On November 21, 2002, MDEQ held a public hearing on
the consent order; MDEQ did not comply with the public hearing
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act because the mee-
ting was very short and the public commentary was truncated. 8 4
On December 4,2002, environmental groups and Midland citizens
filed suit in Ingham County Circuit Court to enjoin the consent
order's implementation.'8 5 The judge ruled against the plaintiffs,
but agreed to a hearing on the consent order after its implementa-
tion. 8 6 The public comment period ended on December 9, 2002,
with MDEQ poised to finalize the consent order. 8 7
As late as December 20, 2002, the consent order's finaliza-
tion appeared assured, but, just before the New Year, the consent
order fell apart. 8 In a December 27, 2002 statement, Dow
announced that it was pulling out of the agreement. 8 9 At the last
moment, MDEQ had changed the final consent order to include no
numbers for an action level, and Dow objected."9 ° Harding later
admitted that the process was rushed.'9 ' The reason for MDEQ's
183 Schimpf, Accord, supra note 170, at 2476.
184 Schimpf, Residents, supra note 181, at 1521. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 299.
9514(7) (2004).18
'Ecology Ctr. v. Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, No. 02-1905-CE (Mich. Cir. filed
Dec. 6, 2002).
186 Id.
187 State, Dow Set to OK Dioxin Deal; Michigan, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 18, 2002,
at El.
188 Scroppo, supra note 161.
189 Sheila Schimpf, Michigan Refuses to Finalize Agreement With Dow on
Allowable Contamination Limits, ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 250, at A-6 (Dec. 31,
2002) [hereinafter Schimpf, Refuses].
190 Eric Pianin, Michigan and Dow Drop Dioxin Pact; State Backs Away from
Plan to Relax Pollution Standards, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2002, at A02.
191 Harding stated:
While it continues to be my belief that a consent order to address the
dioxin contamination in Midland is the appropriate solution, it has
become impossible at this late date to prepare a final document that
not only complies with the environmental statute, but also reflects the
substantive comments received from all parties.
Schimpf, Refuses, supra note 189, at A-6.
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last-minute change of heart was a bit of a mystery, but it likely
stemmed from the sharp criticism that MDEQ received from EPA,
the Michigan Attorney General's Office, DEQ employees, and
environmental groups.
With a new governor and MDEQ leadership, cleanup
negotiations progressed slowly through 2003 and 2004, but Dow
did spend an estimated $25 million cleaning parks along the
Tittabawassee River. 192 In January 2005, Dow and MDEQ agreed
on interim cleanup actions that expanded Dow's cleaning to
include priority areas along the river, areas flooded by the river in
2004, and individual homes.'93 Both Dow and MDEQ hoped to
reach a final cleanup agreement with long term solutions to
Midland's dioxin problems by the end of 2005.194
B. Despite Flaws, Corrective Action Is Strong Enough to Withstand
Political Collusion
The Dow case illustrates the corrective action process in
action, its current flaws, and its strengths. MDEQ and Dow had
avoided the high price of cleaning the Tittabawassee River for
many years, until the corrective action process enabled the first
real action toward that goal. The process works for Dow because
it does not have to admit liability for a century of toxic pollution.
The process works for MDEQ because Michigan is able to protect
its citizens without having to prove Dow liable, and, more impor-
tantly, Michigan does not have to force Dow to clean against its
will. Corrective action will create real progress to prevent some of
the dioxin damage.
The Dow case demonstrates some of the flaws that hamper
the corrective action process. The process still takes too much time
to implement. Dow also demonstrates the unmotivated and eva-
sive actions with which some facilities approach cleanup and
suggests that many facilities may need the government to force
192 Sheila Schimpf, Dow Reaches Agreement With Michigan On 'Framework' for
Cleaning Up Dioxins, DAiLY ENV'T NEWS (BNA) No. 13, at A-12 (Jan. 21, 2004).
193 id.
194 Id.
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cleanup. MDEQ's actions illustrate the importance of the govern-
ment agency in setting cleanup standards. If MDEQ bows to
political or business pressures and does not follow reasonable
environmental standards, then there is a great danger of ineffec-
tive cleanup unless the public intervenes.
The corrective action process may emphasize expediency,
but it is strong enough to withstand even the most blatant political
collusion. RCRA is not a tool for polluting facilities to circumvent
cleanup, but a dynamic program that forces facilities to clean,
regardless of their political or business strength.
IV. How TO UNLEASH RCRA
EPA reforms to RCRA in the late 1990s and early 2000s
have finally allowed RCRA to have some of its intended effect 9 '
but more reforms are needed to fully realize RCRA's potential.
EPA needs to focus not only on performance goals, but also on
cutting more procedural red tape and on actual cleanup. Facilities
need more incentives to complete cleanups and to adopt flexible
solutions or participate in voluntary programs. Funding shortages
require better efficiency or more funding. These reforms can
unleash the potential of RCRA and clean every eligible facility.
A. Long-Term Cleanup, Not Only Short-Term Containment
EPA has made real progress in cutting procedural burdens
in RCRA process,'96 but burdens remain. The CMS and CMI revel
in minutia and require too much time and resources to complete,
while hazardous wastes fester.'97 Paperwork modeled after
CERCLA needs an overhaul addressing RCRA issues and needs. 9
The EI focus has removed procedural paperwork, but some
facilities believe El paperwork has simply replaced it and could
195 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 16.
196 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
197 1997 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 9.
198 Id.
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bog down the system.'9 9 Streamlining the process will save
resources and let real cleanups begin.
While adjusting the performance goal of RCRA to have
high-priority facilities begin cleanup and meet EI standards has
created progress, EPA must be mindful that its refocus only
begins cleanup and does not force facilities to complete cleanup.200
Potentially, this refocus might indicate false progress, as facilities
meet EI standards but do not actually clean anything.2 01 Many
facilities had already controlled human exposure prior to the EPA
goals and the new standards allow many facilities to proclaim
compliance with EPA without taking any cleanup action.20 2
Facilities that need long-term cleanup, yet comply with short-
term EIs, do not have to take any affirmative action. EI is a good
start, but EPA cannot stop there and must stay diligent to
accomplish real progress by completing cleanup.
EPA has made great short-term progress but cannot, as a
result, sacrifice long-term cleanup. In 1997, GAO reported that
facilities had no incentives to endure final cleanup, unless in their
business interest, and by 2000 nothing had changed. 2 3 EPA's focus
on restricting containment, and not on giving facilities reasons to
implement final cleanups, could significantly postpone such final
cleanups. 20 4 "At the current rate of 30 facilities implementing final
cleanups per year, it will take about 27 years for the remaining
809 facilities that we analyzed to at least begin to implement final
cleanups, and years more before they are completed."20 5 In its
2003-08 strategic plan, EPA intends to move toward more final
199 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 17 (stating that "[sleveral state
managers questioned the usefulness of the goals in achieving cleanup progress
and also considered them to be more of a paperwork exercise for the agency").
200 Facilities believe "that the emphasis on meeting the goals to date may have
been more of a paperwork exercise to document that the facilities are meeting
the goals rather than an effort to bring about additional cleanup actions." Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
201 See id.; 1997 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 12.
204 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 18.
205 Id.
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cleanups, but the plan it outlines remains rooted in EI perfor-
mance goals.2 °6 EPA must continue to push facilities to complete
final cleanups as such pushes are the facility's only incentive.
B. Motivating RCRA Facilities and Voluntary Cleanup Programs
EPA can help address long-term cleanup by working with
states to create different cleanup options and flexible oppor-
tunities. In order to accomplish this goal, EPA will have to give
states more autonomy to work directly with these facilities to
create the options. As the Dow case demonstrates, safeguards
prevent corruption in state programs, even with only minimal EPA
guidance." 7
Voluntary cleanup programs have shown promise in some
states,0 8 but EPA has resisted creating nationwide voluntary
programs. °9 Private facilities do not initiate private cleanups for
fear of state or federal action under RCRA.21 ° Facilities also do not
want to spend millions of dollars on a private cleanup only to
206 2008 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 152, at 59.
207 See discussion supra Part III.
208 William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination Cleanup
Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REV.
35, 107-10 (1995).
209 Id. at 38. EPA has resisted because of a complex web of "bureaucratic
preferences and incentives," which Buzbee has described in depth, but which are
beyond the scope of this Note. See id. at 55-100, 116. Buzbee has summarized his
theory of why EPA has failed to create a national voluntary cleanup program as
follows:
The explanation for this failure is found both in relevant statutory
instructions and in bureaucratic preferences and incentives. Cong-
ress failed to anticipate the preferences and incentives of agency
officials and of regulated entities and to modify the statutory
schemes accordingly. Contrary to the common hypothesis that
agencies will seize opportunities to expand, however, EPA resisted
expanding its activities to provide guidance to cleanup volunteers.
Other factors particular to the adjudicatory task of reviewing clean-
up proposals overcame any possible general bureaucratic propensities
to expand an agency's budget and regulatory domain.
Id. at 116.210Id. at 38.
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discover that it did not meet federal or state standards.21 ' The few
state voluntary programs only handle small and low-priority sites,
with varying success, depending on facility liability.212 As a result,
"only a federally enacted or approved... program would facilitate
voluntary cleanups of the more highly contaminated sites."213 A
national voluntary cleanup program, specifically detailing how a
facility could conduct a private cleanup, would give facilities an
opportunity to clean without fear of non-conformance with federal
standards. It would also give responsible facilities the ability to
bypass RCRA process.
C. Address Funding Shortages
Funding RCRA has proven to be a consistent problem and
will continue to plague RCRA without EPA reform. 214 Despite
GAO labeling of funding shortages as the "material weakness for
EPA" handling of RCRA, prior to 1997 EPA requests for RCRA
funding decreased. 21' EPA requested $45 million in fiscal year
1997, $42 million in 1998, and $39 million in 2000.216 In fiscal
year 1999, EPA took $10 million from RCRA to pay for other,
unanticipated projects, leaving RCRA with only $30 million.217
Congress wisely prevented EPA from borrowing from RCRA in
fiscal year 200 1.218 The new, performance-goal necessities spurred
EPA to request $50 million in fiscal year 2001, and even more
211 Id.
212 Buzbee, supra note 208, at 107-10.
213 Michaela S. Moore, Thinking Outside the Box: A Negotiated Settlement
Agreement for the Remediation of the General Electric /Housatonic River Site
Ensures Environmental Health and Economic Prosperity for Pittsfield,
Massachusetts, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 577, 607 (1999). See Buzbee, supra
note 208, at 116.
214 See 1997 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 14-16; 2000 GAO REPORT, supra
note 125, at 18-19.
215 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 18.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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funding will be necessary to handle cleaning of final, complex
facilities before the 2005 deadline.219
State programs also suffer from funding shortages. EPA
authorized these programs to receive grants from EPA, but states
have seen little increase in these grants despite increasing labor
costs. 220 State cleanup managers were already overburdened, but
EPA wanted them to manage even more to meet 2005 goals.221
The simple solution to funding shortages is for EPA to
request more money for RCRA. With increased resources, EPA
could ensure meeting its performance goals and starting final
cleanup. Congress might slightly increase RCRA funding, but the
amount necessary to realize RCRA's potential would require more
than an incremental increase.222 With economic uncertainties and
budget deficits restricting federal funds, EPA can only hope for
more of such funding.
Without a real increase in RCRA funding, EPA must
increase efficiency with current funding. EPA can achieve this by
creating a voluntary cleanup program.223 With facilities following
the program guidelines on their own, only minimal EPA and state
resources would be necessary to monitor the facilities. EPA could
also increase efficiency by eliminating some facilities from RCRA,
such as those facilities that continuously reuse land for hazardous
waste TSD and do not need final cleanup, provided that the faci-
lity meets El standards. 224 Finally, cutting any remaining,
unnecessary procedures descended from CERCLA could reduce
inefficiency and cut costs. 225 With an increase of funding and
efficiency, RCRA could finally fulfill its potential.
219 Id. at 19.
220 id.
221 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 18.
222 Id. at 19-20.
223 See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
224 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 125, at 18.
225 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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CONCLUSION
RCRA has the potential to clean up every active treatment,
storage, and disposal facility rapidly only if the government
unleashes the corrective action procedures. In its early years, EPA
failed to establish a working process and, once it did so, the
burdensome procedures led to little cleanup. By refocusing its
goals on implementing and controlling hazardous wastes, EPA
finally showed the promise of RCRA. The corrective action process
will not only clean major facilities like Dow but also minor
facilities. EPA must not lose sight of long-term cleanup, should
implement a national, voluntary, corrective action program, and
must efficiently use resources allocated to RCRA. Recent progress
has demonstrated the potential of corrective action, and, by fully
unleashing it, EPA can change the world by cleaning up all TSD
waste facilities.
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